By Professor Daniel Gibran
Background
President Nicolas Maduro’s gamble, a call to hold a national Referendum on the Zona de Reclamacion, has turned out to be a masterful but short-lived stroke of political expediency. The Referendum not only galvanized the masses onto the streets in a palpable show of national solidarity, but it also powerfully chimed with the cultural sentiment of all Venezuelans. In their hearts and minds, Essequibo is rightfully theirs. Maduro skillfully tapped into and exploited this sentiment to anneal opposition support and quell domestic protests against his regime. This political cover drive (to use a cricket term) is taken right out of the Argentine playbook in the late 1970’s.
Argentina in the latter half of the 1970’s was in the throes of an economic and fiscal crisis. Labour unrest, resulting in widespread strikes that crippled services such as rail, oil, and banks in 1977 and the motor industry and medical workers in 1978, culminating in a general strike in which 30 percent of the country’s labour force participated. And in March 1981 when General Roberto Viola took over the presidency, Argentina was in the midst of its worst financial crisis since 1976. By mid-1981, all economic indicators were pointing to a deepening of the recession. According to one report, the country in June 1981 was “shaken by its third financial crisis in three months, involving a major panic on the foreign exchange markets. Foreign reserves fell by US$308 million in one day.”
A similar situation prevailed in Venezuela a few years after Nicolas Maduro became President of the Bolivarian Republic. In a move to consolidate power and reign in the Opposition, the new president unleashed a string of draconian policies that plunged the country into near chaos. A Foreign Affairs article captured the scenario succinctly: “Wide-ranging and chaotic expropriations, disastrous price and currency controls, stifling regulations, and unbridled hostility toward the private sector and foreign investment have all helped produce the economic catastrophe that now engulfs Venezuela. Few wars have destroyed as much of a nation’s wealth as have the policies of Chávez and his handpicked successor, Nicolás Maduro.”
The Argentine Lesson
To quell mounting domestic discontent, the Military Junta in Argentina turned to a foreign policy issue to save the day: the invasion and possession of the Falkland Islands in April 1982. Maduro understands the persuasive pull and attraction that resides in the fulfillment of a promise to tangibly realize every Venezuelan’s dream and turn the mounting tide of domestic and opposition calls for free and fair elections. The Referendum was the first cock’s crow signaling his unwavering intention to annex Essequibo. Unlike the Falkland’s imbroglio where the Military Junta miscalculated the British determined resolve to go to war, should diplomacy fail, Maduro has no such fears. But there is something that is lingering in his mind as he cogitates his options. Fear of a long-drawn-out military adventure into the Zona de Reclamacion is not one of them.
The outcome of the Referendum is not in doubt either. The results would show overwhelming support for the Government to commence annexation. But Maduro is not a fool. He is a student of recent history. He remembers very well the fate of General Galtieri and the other generals who decided to invade the Falkland Islands. Months after the humiliating defeat by British forces, they were driven out of office. The legions of support they mustered so quickly and overwhelmingly evaporated overnight. But Maduro faces a vastly different scenario. However, the compulsion to act, to do something to demonstrate that it was not all bluster and boisterous rhetoric, forces him to stay the course and not back down from prosecuting a course of action congruent with the results of the Referendum. In other words, failure to do “something” would be politically disastrous for him. The political and survival stakes are optimum in his calculation. What will he do? That is the million-dollar question.
A Likely Scenario
President Maduro, on the day after the Referendum, faces a powerful constraint. The Biden Administration will not countenance a Venezuelan annexation of Essequibo. He also knows that the economic sanctions, not too long ago lifted, can be reinstated. Other constraining factors can include suasions from EU countries through diplomatic pressures and ripples that can flow from a wanton disregard of the ICJ’s ruling. But Maduro can unshackle himself from these constraints and decide to take some level of action that will meld domestic expectations. In short, he has to do “something.”
The most likely course of action would be for him to fully occupy the little Island of Ankoko. Having accomplished that feat quickly and swiftly, he can announce to all Venezuelans that the annexation process has begun. This would not be a difficult sell to a highly gullible domestic audience. The reality, however, would be different. Maduro will not continue the process. And he would have consolidated his grip on political power; his mission accomplished. Viva Maduro!
